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Abstract
The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification for eminent do-
main, but the nature of the problem is not well understood. This paper models the
holdout problem in a bargaining framework, where a developer seeks to acquire
several parcels of land for a large-scale development. We show that in the absence
of eminent domain, holdouts are inevitable, threatening costly delay. However,
if the developer has the power to use eminent domain to acquire the land from
holdouts, all sellers will bargain, thus avoiding delay. An offsetting cost is that
owners may negotiate prices below their true value, possibly resulting in exces-
sive transfer of land to the developer.
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A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings 
 
1. Introduction 
 The holdout problem is commonly (and properly) cited as the justification for 
forced sales of land under the government’s power of eminent domain.1  The threat of 
holdouts arises when the government or a private developer attempts to assemble several 
contiguous parcels of land in order to complete a large-scale development project like a 
highway, railroad, or shopping center.  In this setting, individual landowners, knowing 
that each of their parcels is essential for completion of the overall project, may seek 
prices in excess of their true valuations, thereby causing delay, increased costs, and 
possibly failure to complete the project at all. 
 Though the holdout problem has been much discussed by scholars, few have 
attempted to model it formally.2  As a result, its exact nature and the resulting 
inefficiency are unclear.  Some have described it as a problem of monopoly,3 while others 
have characterized it in terms of transaction costs or breakdowns in bargaining.4  The 
monopoly argument seems to suggest that projects involving holdouts will be 
underprovided (due to the overpricing of land), while the bargaining cost approach tends 
to focus on delay as the primary source of inefficiency.5 
 In this paper, we adopt the latter perspective and examine the holdout problem in 
a bargaining framework.  Specifically, we consider a government agency or private 
                                                 
1
 There is a large economic literature on eminent domain, beginning with the classic paper by Blume, 
Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984) (also see Hermalin (1995) and Nosal (2001)).  However, most of this 
literature has focused on the impact of compensation on land use incentives and the taking decision by the 
government. 
2
 Two exceptions are Strange (1995) and Menezes and Pitchford (2001).  
3
 See, for example, Posner (2005, p. 55) and Knetsch and Borcherding (1979, p. 244). 
4
 See Shavell (2005, p. 125) and Cooter and Ulen (1988, p. 193). 
5
 On the latter point, see Fischel (1995, p. 68) and Hirsch (1999, p. 28). 
 2 
developer (henceforth, simply the developer) who needs to assemble several parcels of 
land for a large-scale project.  The developer can negotiate individually, or jointly, with 
the owners and can do so in one of two periods.  If, at the end of the second period, the 
developer has acquired all of the parcels, he can proceed with the project, but if not (i.e., 
if he has only acquired some or none of the parcels), he will scrap it.  To capture the cost 
of delay, we assume that the gross value of the project is higher if it can be completed 
after the first period rather than after the second.  We assume that individual sellers 
behave non-cooperatively in deciding when to come to the bargaining table, but that any 
sellers at the table in a given period engage in a Nash bargaining game with the developer 
to determine the prices of their individual parcels.6 
 In this setting, we show that holding out (i.e., waiting until the second period to 
bargain) is always a Nash equilibrium, and in some cases it is the only equilibrium.  This 
is true even though completion of the project in the first period is a Pareto-superior 
outcome.  The reason for this result is that each seller perceives that he would gain a 
bargaining advantage by waiting to sell in period two if all other sellers sell in period one.  
 Given the inefficiency associated with holdouts, we ask what will happen if the 
developer is given the power to use eminent domain in period two to take any parcels that 
he was not able to acquire consensually in period one.7  If compensation for takings is set 
at a property’s market value (which we assume is less than its true value to the owner), 
we show that the unique equilibrium in the face of a takings threat is for all owners to sell 
in period one. Intuitively, owners sell in period one to avoid the loss from a taking in 
                                                 
6
 In this respect, the model closely resembles that developed by Menezes and Pitchford (2001) in a different 
context. 
7
 We actually show that it is always optimal for the developer to try to bargain in period one, even if he has 
the right to use eminent domain in that period as well.  
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period two.  Thus, the mere threat of eminent domain is sufficient to overcome the 
holdout problem. 
 Although this outcome is potentially welfare-improving because it avoids the cost 
of delay, there is an offsetting cost owing to the fact that the takings threat may induce 
owners to sell at prices below their true reservation prices.  As a result, developers may 
go ahead with inefficient projects—that is, projects whose gross value is less than the 
sum of the values of the individual parcels to their owners.  This is possible in our model, 
even though eminent domain is never actually used, because of the effect of its threatened 
use on land prices. 
 We develop this argument as follows.  Section 2 sets up the model.  Section 3 
describes the bargaining between the developer and landowners when there is no threat of 
a taking.  Section 4 then shows how bargaining is affected when the developer has the 
power to use eminent domain to take any parcels that he is not able to acquire in a 
consensual transaction.  Section 5 examines the allocative cost of eminent domain, and 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Setup of the Model  
Consider a developer who wishes to acquire two adjacent (and identical) parcels 
of land, designated A and B, for a development project.  Let 
V = gross value of the development if completed; 
v =  value of each parcel to its owner (the owner’s reservation price); 
m = market value of each parcel; also the value of a single parcel to the developer. 
We assume that 
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  V > 2v,        (1) 
reflecting the complementariness of the parcels when consolidated for development.  
Given (1), it is efficient for the developer to acquire the parcels. We also assume, 
however, that 
  v > m,         (2) 
reflecting the fact that owners typically value their land in excess of its market value. 
This also implies that it is not efficient for the developer to acquire only one parcel. 
 We suppose that bargaining between the developer and the landowners can take 
place at two dates: t=1 (now), and t=2 (later).  The developer can thus proceed with the 
development under any of the following scenarios: (a) he succeeds in buying both parcels 
now, (b) he buys one now and one later, (c) and he buys both later.  However, if he is 
unable to acquire both parcels by t=2, we assume that he abandons the project altogether, 
resulting in a return of zero if he has acquired neither parcel, and m if he has acquired 
only one.   
Note that scenarios (b) and (c) differ from (a) in that completion of the project is 
delayed.  We assume that this imposes a cost on the developer equal to δ>0.  However, 
we also assume that 
  V – δ > 2v,        (3) 
implying that it is still efficient to complete the development at this date.  The cost of 
delay is the sole cost associated with the holdout problem in the current model.8  Finally, 
we assume that all payoffs are realized at t=2, and there is no discounting. 
                                                 
8
 This reflects Cohen’s (1991, p. 354) argument that buyers and sellers ultimately recognize their joint 
interests in completing a sale.  Another interpretation of δ is that it is the transaction costs the developer 
must incur in order to strike a bargain with holdouts.  Regardless of the interpretation, one would expect δ 
 5 
 
3.   Bargaining between the Developer and Landowners when there is no Threat of 
Eminent Domain  
 
 We consider a two-stage game in which sellers first make a non-cooperative 
choice of when to bargain with the developer (now or later).  Then, in each of the two 
periods, any sellers at the bargaining table engage in Nash bargaining with the developer. 
We proceed in reverse sequence by first describing the outcome of the bargaining in each 
period.     
A. Bargaining 
Consider first the case where period two has arrived and the developer has 
acquired neither of the parcels.  That is, both owners were period-one holdouts.  Since (3) 
implies there is still a surplus to be divided among the three parties, and there is no 
possible bargaining in the future, both sellers have an interest in engaging in bargaining 
now.9  If the developer acquires both parcels, his net return is  
V–δ–P2A–P2B,         (4) 
where P2A and P2B are the prices obtained by owners A and B in period 2.10  As noted, the 
developer’s threat point is zero since failure to acquire both parcels will result in the 
project’s being scrapped.  As for sellers, their return from a sale is simply the price, and 
their threat points are v.  Using the Nash bargaining solution applied to a three-way 
bargain (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990, p. 23), we obtain the prices by solving: 
  
BA PP 22 ,
max (V–δ–P2A–P2B )(P2A–v)(P2B–v).     (5) 
                                                                                                                                                 
to be increasing in the number of parcels that must be assembled, and also possibly in the magnitude of the 
surplus generated by assembly. 
9
 In contrast, condition (2) implies that a unilateral sale would never be profitable in t=2.  
10
 Henceforth, superscripts denote parcels and subscripts denote periods. 
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Since the sellers are identical, each sells for  
   
3
ˆ
2
vVP +−= δ .       (6) 
The resulting net return to the developer, found by setting P2A=P2B= 2ˆP in (4), is 
  
3
2vV −− δ
,        (7) 
which is positive given (3). 
 Consider next the case where the developer succeeded in acquiring parcel A in 
period 1 for a price 1P
A
, and now seeks to buy parcel B in period two for a price P2B.  If 
he succeeds his net return is again given by (4), but his threat point is now m– 1P A.  The 
situation for the seller is the same as before.  Thus, P2B solves 
  
BP2
max  [(V–δ– 1P A–P2B ) – (m– 1P A)](P2B–v).     (8) 
The result is 
  
2
*2
mvVP −−+= δ .       (9) 
(Note that this price is independent of the period one price.)  Comparison of (6) and (9) 
shows that P2*> 2ˆP  given (2) and (3).  Thus, it is better for a seller to be a lone holdout 
compared to the case where both holdout and sell in period two. 
 Now move back to period one.  There are three possibilities here: (a) both sellers 
bargain (and sell), (b) one sells and one holds out, and (c) both holdout.  We have already 
seen that case (c) results in sale by both sellers in period two for 2ˆP .  Thus, we need only 
consider (a) and (b).  In case (a), both sellers bargain.  If both sell, the developer’s net 
 7 
return is V–P1A–P1B,11 and each seller receives the sale price. As for the threat points, 
note that a failure to reach a bargain in period one still allows the parties to bargain in 
period two.  Thus, the threat points for all three parties are the net returns from that 
bargain as derived above (specifically, the price in (6) for each seller and the return in (7) 
for the developer).  Bringing all of this together, we can determine the period-one prices 
from a three-way bargain as the solution to 
      
BA PP 11 ,
max 










 +−
−










 +−
−










 −−
−−−
333
2)( 1111
vVPvVPvVPPV BABA δδδ . (10) 
Symmetry again implies that both sellers sell for the same price:  
  
3
ˆ
1
vVP += .        (11) 
Comparison of (6) and (11) shows that 21 ˆˆ PP > .  That is, sellers would prefer to 
sell jointly in period one rather than period two, owing to the larger surplus available to 
be divided in period one.  Further, comparison of (9) and (11) shows that P2* 1ˆP
<
>
.  Thus, 
a seller may or may not prefer being the lone holdout in period one compared to the case 
where both sell in one.  The reason for the ambiguity here is the cost of delay, δ, which 
favors a sale by both in period one.  Thus, the larger is δ the more likely it is that 
P2*< 1ˆP .
12
   
The final case is where owner A sells in period one while owner B holds out.  
Both the developer and the willing seller anticipate that the holdout will sell in period two 
for P2* (assuming that the period-one sale occurs), and the threat points, as above, are the 
                                                 
11
 Note that there is no cost of delay in this case. 
12
 The specific condition for P2* to be larger is 2δ<V–δ+v–3m, where the right-hand side is positive by (2) 
and (3).  Thus, P2* will definitely be larger if δ=0. 
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returns from a joint sale in period two.  Thus, P1A in the current case is determined by the 
solution to 


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1
vVPvVPPV AA
P A
δδδ ,  (12) 
and the result is 
    
4
*1
mvVP +−+= δ .       (13) 
Using our previous results, we can show that P2*>P1*, and *ˆˆ 121 PPP >> .  Thus, being 
the lone seller in period one is clearly the worst possible outcome. 
 
B. Equilibrium Behavior of Sellers 
 Now that we have derived the equilibrium prices under the assumption of 
cooperative bargaining among those at the bargaining table, we turn to the choices of 
individual sellers regarding when to come to the bargaining table and when to holdout.  
As noted above, the sellers make this choice non-cooperatively.   
In deciding when to come to the bargaining table, each seller has two possible 
strategies: bargain, or holdout.  The analysis in the previous section determined the 
prices that would result from each possible combination of these strategies, and they are 
shown in Table 1.  (Note that because we assumed that any period-one holdouts would 
bargain in period two, there is no separate decision in that period. Thus, the strategy 
“holdout” means holdout now and bargain in period two.)   
[Table 1 here] 
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The nature of the equilibria depends on relationship between P2* and 1ˆP , which 
we showed above is ambiguous.  Thus, there are two possibilities.  First, when P2*> 1ˆP , 
there is a unique Nash equilibrium wherein both sellers holdout.  In this case, the 
individual gain from being the lone holdout dominates the joint benefits from a period-
one sale by both sellers.  Thus, holding out is a dominant strategy for both sellers.  
Alternatively, when P2*< 1ˆP , there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria: (bargain, 
bargain) and (holdout, holdout).  In this case, the best strategy depends on what each 
seller thinks the other will do.  Although both sellers are better off if they jointly bargain 
(since 21 ˆˆ PP > ), each wants to guard against the possibility of being the lone seller in 
period one.   
In terms of efficiency, the net gain is V–2v when both sellers agree to sell in 
period one, and V–δ–2v when both holdout in period one and then sell in period two.  
Thus, although development in either period is preferred to the status quo, there is a 
social cost associated with delay.  Despite this cost, the results in this section show that 
there is no way to guarantee that a holdout problem will not occur, and in some cases, it 
is the only equilibrium.  
 
4. Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent Domain 
 This section asks whether the threat of a taking by the developer can help to 
alleviate the risk of a holdout problem.13  We assume that the developer first seeks to 
                                                 
13
 We have not distinguished between public and private projects, so our model does not shed any light on 
the “public use” question—that is, the question of whether private developers should ever have the power 
of eminent domain to overcome holdouts, or whether its use should be limited to government projects.  The 
Supreme Court recently ruled that under certain circumstances, private developers should have the power 
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negotiate a consensual sale with both sellers in period one (as above), but that he has the 
right to use eminent domain in period two to take any properties that he was unable to 
acquire in period one.  (We show below that it is always optimal for the developer to try 
to negotiate a sale before resorting to eminent domain anyway.)  If the developer takes a 
property, he has to pay the owner its market value, m, and he also incurs a 
transaction/litigation cost, τ, per property taken. We assume sellers incur no transaction 
costs when their land is taken, but they do incur a loss given m<v.   
 As above, we begin in period two by considering the case where neither property 
was acquired in period one (i.e., both sellers held out).  In this case, the developer will 
take both properties provided that  
  V – δ – 2(m+τ) ≥ 0.       (14) 
Note that a sufficient condition for (14) to hold, given (3), is m+τ≤v.  Similarly, if the 
developer was only able to acquire one property in period one for a price P1, he will take 
the second in period two provided that 
  V – δ – (m+τ) – P1 ≥ m – P1, 
or   
  V – δ – 2m – τ ≥ 0,       (15) 
which is satisfied given (14). 
 Assuming that (14) holds, the threat to use eminent domain in period two is 
credible.  Thus, we turn to the bargaining between the developer and the sellers in period 
one in the shadow of this threat.  Consider first the case where both sellers bargain.  In 
                                                                                                                                                 
(see Kelo v. City of New London (2005)), but the issue remains controversial.  See Epstein (1985, Chapter 
12), Merrill (1986), and Fischel (1995, pp. 71-75). 
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this case, the threat point for the sellers is m, while the threat point for the developer is 
the left-hand side of (14).  The prices therefore solve 
 
[ ] ))(()(2()(max 1111
, 11
mPmPmVPPV BABA
PP BA
−−+−−−−− τδ ,   (16) 
which yields 
  
3
2
ˆ
1
δτ +
+= mP .       (17) 
Sellers are thus able to extract a price in excess of their market value because, by selling 
in period one, they save the developer the cost of delay plus the transaction costs of using 
eminent domain.  Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that (17) is larger than the sellers’ 
reservation price, v. This reflects the developer’s credible threat to take the land for m in 
period two.  (We return to this point in the next section.)  Finally, note that the developer 
is better off seeking to bargain in period one rather than resorting to eminent domain 
immediately since his surplus from doing to (the term in square brackets in (16)) turns 
out to be (δ+2τ)/3 in equilibrium, which is clearly positive.  
 Consider next the case where only seller A bargains in period one while seller B 
holds out.  The threat points are the same as in (16), but in this case, the developer’s 
return if he succeeds in buying parcel A is V–δ–P1A–(m+τ) since he will have to take 
parcel B by eminent domain in period two.  The sale price for parcel A, P1A, is therefore 
determined by 
  
AP1
max [(V–δ–P1A–(m+τ))–(V–δ–2(m+τ))](P1A–m),   (18) 
and the resulting price is  
  P1* = m + 2
τ
.        (19) 
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Comparison of (17) and (19) shows that 11ˆ PP > *>m.  Thus, from the perspective of 
individual sellers, it is best if both sell in period one, next best to be the lone seller in 
period one, and worst to be a holdout.    
 Given these results, we now reconsider the equilibrium decisions of sellers in the 
face of eminent domain.  The payoff matrix is shown in Table 2, where 1ˆP  and P1* are 
now given by (17) and (19).  The unique Nash equilibrium in this case is for both sellers 
to bargain.  Thus, the threat of eminent domain does in fact succeed in eliminating the 
holdout problem.  (Note that because eminent domain is never actually used in 
equilibrium, the litigation costs are never incurred.) 
[Table 2 here] 
 
5. The Cost of Eminent Domain 
 The preceding analysis has shown that the economic benefit of eminent domain is 
avoidance of the holdout problem.  In this sense, it improves efficiency by saving the cost 
of delay.  In this section, however, we note an offsetting cost of eminent domain that 
arises from the possibility that owners, when faced with the threat of a taking, may sell 
their properties for less than their opportunity costs.  First, note that the condition for this 
underpricing to occur is that the expression in (17) is less than v, or  
  v – m > 
3
2 δτ +
,       (20) 
which is more likely to hold the larger is the owner’s “subjective value,” v–m, and the 
smaller are the developer’s litigation costs and costs of delay.14   
                                                 
14
 It is worth noting that the left- and right-hand sides of (20) may not be independent.  Specifically, as a 
landowner’s subjective value, v–m, grows, he is likely to fight harder to avoid a taking, in which case the 
 13 
When (20) holds, the threat of eminent domain redistributes the gains from 
development in favor of the developer compared to a world in which sellers have the 
right to refuse any offer.  While this does not represent a loss in efficiency when 
condition (1) holds (i.e., given that the project promises a net benefit), it does entail a loss 
in welfare to the extent that considerations of fairness and/or respect for private property 
rights matter to society.15   
 In addition, however, the possibility that owners will agree to sell their properties 
for less than their reservation prices may entail a loss in efficiency due to the risk of 
excessive takings.  The problem is that there may be no way to ensure that the targeted 
land is more valuable to the developer than to the owners absent the owners’ right to 
refuse to sell.  In ordinary market transactions, an owners’ right of refusal guarantees that 
any transfer of property is value-enhancing in the sense that the buyer values the property 
more than the seller.  In contrast, when the developer has the power of eminent domain, 
we have shown that owners may consent to sell for prices below their true reservation 
price for fear that their land will be taken for an even smaller amount of compensation 
later.  This will result in inefficient projects going forward if 2v>V>2 1ˆP , or if v> 1ˆP , 
which is the same as condition (20).    
The crux of the problem, of course, is that courts have interpreted the “just 
compensation” provision of the Fifth Amendment to require market-value compensation, 
                                                                                                                                                 
litigation cost of using eminent domain, τ, will tend to increase as well.  Based on this logic, Merrill (1986, 
p. 101) and Fischel (1995, p. 74) have argued that eminent domain will tend to be “self-limiting,” 
especially in cases where the cost of holdouts (as captured by δ on the right-hand side of (20)) is small. 
15
 This reflects Epstein’s (1985, Chapter 12) concern about the allocation of the surplus from a taking as 
between the beneficiaries of the taking and those whose land is taken. 
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the justification being that they cannot observe the true value of the land to the owner.16  
This illustrates a fundamental trade-off associated with eminent domain.  On one hand, 
there is the risk of costly delay in the production of large-scale projects due to the holdout 
problem, but on the other there is the possibility of overinvestment in such projects due to 
the underpricing of properties in the face of a takings threat.17  The optimal scope of 
eminent domain must balance these offsetting factors. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper has examined the impact of eminent domain on the bargaining 
between a developer and landowners when the potential for holdouts exists.  The key 
conclusion is that the threatened use of eminent domain overcomes the holdout problem, 
thereby promising a potential gain in efficiency.  An offsetting cost, however, is that by 
removing landowners’ right to refuse a sale, there is a risk of excessive transfer of land to 
the developer.  This suggests that use of eminent domain should be limited to large-scale 
projects in which the threat of holdouts is significant.  
                                                 
16
 See Knetsch and Borcherding (1979), Epstein (1985, pp. 174-175), and Fischel (1995, pp. 207-209).  In 
practice, the difference between v and m is likely to be larger the longer the owner of the land (or his 
ancestors) has occupied the property.   As Oliver Wendell Holmes (1897, p. 477) colorfully observed, “A 
thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes 
root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself…” 
17
 This same trade-off arises whenever a “liability rule” (a forced sale) is substituted for a “property rule” (a 
market transfer).  See generally Calabresi and Melamed (1972) and Kaplow and Shavell (1996). 
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Table 1: Payoff matrix for sellers’ choice of when to bargain. 
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Table 2: Payoff matrix for sellers in face of eminent domain. 
 
 
 
